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Private renegotiation of debt repayments and  new loans  is
inefi-cient because of the creditors' seniority privileges and lack
of commitment and the inadequate information creditors have
about debtors' policy choices.
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A simple  dynamic  model  is presented  in which  anticipate  this possibility  leadling  to less  initial
the  motivation  for borrowing  from abroad  is to  lenidinig  and  a faster  build-up  of a  debt  overhang.
smooth  consumption  over timTle  when  national  income
is subject  to ran(lom  fluctuations.  The  borrower  Thei  paper  also  presents  a mo(icl  of strategic
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Nontechnical Summary
The current absence of financial assistance from the private credit
markets of the developed countries for  undertaking investments in the
less-developed  nations is  widely regarded to  be inefficient.  The potential
high productivity of investment in the capital-poor regions of the world
suggests that the existence of high external debt burdens is inhibiting the
efficient allocation of capital internationally.  The intervention  by
creditor country governments and international  financial institutions in
private lending to less-developed  countries requires justification by the
presence of social inefficiencies in the private negotiation of sovereign
de'ot  repayments and new capital inflows.
While the presence of sovereign immunity restricts the amount of
resources that can be transferred  through private international credit
transactions, the absence of commitment technologies for both creditors and
debtors can create socially inefficient  outcomes due to time inconsistency
and incomplete  coordination across market participants.  Possible sources
of market failure can be exacerbated  by the legal and political
institutions  surrounding credit markets.  The type of potential
coordination failure that  has received the most attention by writers on
sovereign lending is the inability  of the coalition of existing creditors
to achieve a cooperative equilibrium  because of the public goods nature of
new funds enhancing repayment streams.  Difficulties can also arise
coordinating the policy choices of debtor governements  with the actions of
creditors because debtor policies can affect the surplus  bargained over
during negotiations of net resource transfers.  Bilateral private
renegotiation  of debt claims itself can be inefficient if the commitment of
the  bargaining parties is incomplete  or if there is asymmetric information
between parties.
The legal status of existing debt claims can create a distortion in
the flow of new resources of capital formation  because the social returns
to  new investment  may partly accrue to non-providers of the new capital.
The privileges enjoyed  by old lenders  may deny new creditors their
opportunity cost of capital, even though it is exceeded  by the marginal
productivity of investment.  The frequently  discussed free-ridersh-.p
problem in international lending  arises because of this externalit".
Ho'wever  uncertain their ultimate  value, legal privileges provide
reservation levels of utility for old creditors which can inhibit
coordinated lending.  The difficulty for assuring new cpaital flows to
heavily indebted countries  when further lending is socially efficient
(subject  to the constraint imposed  by sovereign immunity) is the absence of
mechanisms for credible commitment of lenders to a coordinated policy.
Cooperative equilibria for the coalition of lenders may not be attainable
because of the time consistency problem created by institutional
distortions.
Bargaining between creditors and debtors during renegotiations  of
initial  contractual obligations can also be subject to inefficiencies.  The
role of institutions  which allocate legal  privileges among the set of
creditors for the conduct of debt renegotiations  is crucial.  Institutionsii
which create both legal priviiLge and provide  mechanisms for credible
commitment by some of the parties to a long-term relationship play a major
role in thc conduct of bargaining.  The primary purpose of this  paper is to
discuss tie importance  of inefficiencies  in debt renegotiation  which arise
as a consequence of  seniority  privileges and absence of commitment by
creditors.  A secondary purpose is to examine the effect of asymmetries of
informationi  about the opportunities availabla to debtors between lenders
and borrowers on the outcomes achievable in a bargained renegotiation.
The model studied concentrates on the importance  of the basic
institutional.  and informational  environment on renegotiar4on in a simple
dynamic context.  The motivation for borrowing from abroad is to simooth
consumption across dates  when national income is subject to random shocks.
This setting contrasts with a repeated static one because the sanctions
available to creditors to punish a repudiating debtor are imposed in future
periods rather than the current one; an example of such penalties is the
disruption of intertemporal  trade, that is, access to future insurance.  In
a repeated static model, bargaining between debtors and creditors results
in a  trade of sanctions for the current period for a current payment in
settlement of debt-service obligations.  The outcome of a strategic
non-cooperative  bargaining game yields loan flows constrained only
sovereign immunity,  exactly as in Eaton ard Gersovitz (1981) (although  they
do not allow renegotiation, it only introcuces  a quantitative difference).
In the forward-looking  sanctions  model, the absence of commitment and
seniority privilege of existing creditors render strategic  bargaining
equilibria inefficient  relative to the international  allocations of capital
feasible under sovereign immunity.
Time inconsistency  arises in bargaining because lenders cannot commit
themselves to accept future  net transfers which they  will wish to
renegotiate in some, if not all, contingencies.  If creditors provided
'Loans  with state-contingent  repayment schedules, then an equilibrium path
for capital flows is attained which is efficient given the constraint that
the  debtor can repudiate and accept che consequent sanctions at any time.
Such a plan requires that the repayment schedules  be binding on the
creditors, and in most cases, the lender  will write a contract which
requires a net transfer from it to the debtor to settle the contract.  That
is, ex ante state-contingent  contracts provide insurance that  may be
incomplete due to the insuree's ability to repudiate.  Ex post
renegotiations  of debt contracts conveying seniority privileges of some
type do not lead to equivalent  outcomes due to the absence of commitment
mechanisms for creditors.  It is important to note that this paper explores
the inefficiency  of renegotiation  using a particular form of bargaining
conduct, but the qualitative results emphasized generalize to any exogenous
distribution of bargaining power in the renegotiation  game.
The importance of asymmetries of information for the allocational
efficiency of private bargaining over debt repayments and new inflows is
also discussed.  The existence of private information  creates an additional
disturtion in the  bargaining process with seniority privileges.  In
particular, even when the current creditors possess all the power in
renegotiations, a debtor who would be willing to repay in full may be able
to renegotiate debt-service  obligations to its advantage.  These
possibilities further limit the extent of smooth-ng ovE.r  random incomeiii
shocks which is provided by private creditors.  The case of strategic
bargaining with shared  bargaining strength is modelled in a growing economy
under asymmetric information  about the government's social preferences (the
domestic political environment's  constraints on debt-service).  In this
case, delay in agreement during renegotiations is  used strategically to
elicit private information.  The suspension  of new inflows for capital
formation can make these delays especially costly.
The inability of debtor countries to adopt socially efficient policies
can arise for both reasons of domestic  political economy and the presence
of external payment obligations  which are enforced by sanctions, whose
value can be affected  by domestic policy choice.  Furthermore, the adoption
of a socially beneficial plan may require  coordinated action by both
lenders and borrowers.  When the only policy tools available for
transferring resources for debt repayment  from the private sector to the
government are distortionary, then the post-tax rate of re..urn  on
investment  will be endogenous to the  net external.  transfer anticipated.  In
the absence of external finance, the government must reduce the  net tax
burden on investment  by either substituting  other t.-  3s  (current or futrue)
or reducing expenditures.  Both measures carry soc  .1  costs.  Since the
optimal policy choices for the government  depend u on the supply of
external credit, the rate of return for foreign lenders could be rising in
the amount lent.  With many lenders this could lead to a problem of
coordination between creditors.  However, the debtor's ex ante optimal
policy choices may not be time consistent; that is, commitment by both
parties may be required to attain an efficient flow of resources.
The bargaining problem discussed in this paper does not address the
issue of  coordinatiorn  within the coalition of  current creditors.  Nor does
it address the problems of  coordination  and time inconsistency for
simultaneous policy choices for debtors and creditors.  The emphasis is on
the distinction  between contracts  which are written ex ante as state
contingent in an uncertain world and those that exchange resources for some
ability to impose sanctions, the  value of which are negotiated ex post.
The argument that the latter  can merely comprise an implicit contract which
duplicates a formal state-contingent  contract has appeared in the
literature.  The point of this paper is that these are fundamentally  not
equivalent.  The importance  of legal privileges,  however uncertain, for the
efficiency of capital mobility under renegotiation should not be
understated.  Perhaps, the main policy implications  to be drawn from this
tentative analysis is that the  possibilities of official alienation of
these privileges, increased  regulation of private capital flows, and the
introduction  of alternative instruments  for providing capital flows to
developing regions should  be explored.1
Inefficient  Private Renegotiation of Sovereign Debt
The current absence of financial assistance from the private credit
markets of the developed countries for undertaking investments in the
less-developed  nations is  widely regarded to  be inefficLert.  The potential
high productivity of investment in the capital-poor regions of the  world
suggests that the existence of  high external debt burdens is inhibiting the
efficient allocation  of capital internationally.  The intervention  by
creditor country governments  and irternational  financial institutions  in
private lending to less-developed  countries requires justification  by the
presence of social inefficiencies  in the private negotiation of sovereign
debt repayments and new capital inflows.  While the presence of sovereign
immunity  restricts the amount of resources that can be transferred through
private international  credit transactions,  the absence of commitment
technologies  for both creditors and debtors  can create socially inefficient
outcomes due to time inconsistency  and incomplete  coordination across
market participants.  In a second-best  world, the legal and political
institutions  surrounding iaternational  credit markets can exacerbate the
effects of incomplete  commitment  by the  negotiating parties.  Coordination
failures can arise within the group of creditors in their lending  practices
or between creditors and debtors in the choice of their respective
policies.  Time inconsistency  of constrained optimal resource allocations
(by  sovereign immunity)  can appear in  both debtor actions and in the
lending  behavior of creditors.
The type of potential coordination failure that  has received the most
attention by writers on sovereign lending is the inability  of the coalition
of existing creditors to achieve a cooperative  equilibrium because of the2
public goods nature of new funds enhancing repayment streams.  The legal
status of existing debt claims can create a distortion in the flow of new
resources of capital formation because the social returns to new investment
may partly accrue to non-providers  of the  new capital.  The privileges
enjoyed  by old lenders  may deny new creditors their opportunity cost of
capital, even though it is exceeded by the marginal productivity of
investment.  The frequently discussed free-ridership  problem in
international lending  arises because of this externality.  However
uncertain their ultimate value, legal privileges  provide reservation levels
of utility for old creditors  which can inhibit coordinated lending.  The
difficulty for assuring new cpaital flows to heavily indebted countries
when further lending is socially efficient (subject to the constraint
imposed  by sovereign immunit-y)  is the absence of mechanisms for credible
commitment  of lenders to a cocrdinated  policy.  Cooperative equl. bria for
the coalition of  lenders  may not be attainable  because of the time
consistency  problem created  by institutional  distortions.
Bilateral private renegotiation of debt claims itself can be
inefficient if the commitment of the  bargaining parties is incomplete or if
there is asymmetric information  between parties.  The role of institutions
which allocate legal privileges among the set of creditors for the 'onduct
of debt renegotiations is crucial.  Institutior.s  which create both legal
privilege and provide mechanisms for credible commitment by some of thk
parties to a long-term relationship  play a major role in the conduct of
bargaining.  The primary purpose of this  paper is to discuss the importance
of inefficiencies in debt renegotiation  which arise as a consequence of
seniority  privileges and absence of commitment  by creditors.  A.  secondary
purpose is to examine the effect of asymmetries of information about the3
opportunities  available  to  debtors  between  lenders  and  borrowers  on the
outcomes  achievable  in  a bargained  renegotiation.
Credit  market  equilibria  are  studied  when  debt  contracts  can  be
subsequently  renegotiated  in a simple  model  of  borrowing  from  abroad  to
smooth  consumption  when  national  income  subject  to  stochastic  shocks.
Borrowers  have  the  ability  to repudiate  their  obligations,  but face
sanctions  for  doing  so.  Lenders  are  arsumed  to  be risk  neutral  and there
is free  entry  in loan  contracts,  so that  new  creditors  will  provide  any
debt  contract  which  assures  them  non-negative  expected  profits  given
existing  debt  service  obligations.  When  a debtor  suffers  a low  income
state,  repudiation  with  consequent  penalization  can  be superior  to  meeting
debt  service  obligations  as  originally  contracted  and  choosing  a new  debt
contract  that  provides  zero  expected  profits  to lenders. In  this  case,
existing  creditors  have  an incentive  to  reduce  the  repayment  obligations
and  refrain  from  declaring  a default. A breach  of  contract  does  not
automatically  lead  to declaration  of  default,  because  this  is  a subsequent
option  available  to creditors  and  need  not  be exercised.
The  primary  purpose  of the  analysis  of this  paper  is  to investigate
market  imperfections  which  arise  in  the  renegotiation  of sovereign  debt in
a fairly  general  bargaining  framework.  The  institutional  environment  in
which  debt  contract  renegotiation  takes  place  is  a crucial  determinant  of
the  welfare  economics  of sovereign  lending. In  particular,  the  privileges
which  existing  creditors  possess  with  respect  to  other  creditors  and
potential  lenders  as  well as their  debtors  are important  both  for
supporting  lending  and  for  the  conduct  of renegotiations.  The  role  of
seniority  rights  for  existirg  creditors  in  the  presence  of potential  free
entry  by new  lenders  is investigated  at length  in  this  paper.4
Contract renegotiations are first studied in the consumption smoothing
model for the case in  which all characteristics  of the debtor ire  common
knowledge.  Equilibrium renegotiations;  of payments and new loan contracts
are characterized in a bargaining envircnment in which the existing
creditors offer settlements to debtors which are accepted or rejected,
subject to the discipline of potential entry in new loans.  Under seniority
privileges, the negotiated settlements  are shown to  be equivalent to the
provision of a new debt contract  which any potential entrant would offer
along with a possible reduction in the current debt-service due.  This
follows from the intertemporal  optimization  problem for the creditors.
While unmet current debt-service obligations  may be rolled forward in a
renegotiation, in the general case creditor optimal renegotiations will be
a hybrid of debt-service reduction, new loans, and increased future debt
burden.  The simple relending of old debt-service  obligations has an
opportunity cost as well as a non-negative option value.
When the seniority privileges of existing creditors preclude entry by
other potential lenders,  current creditors  may ?-.  ide net transfers to a
debtor as part of a renegotiation offer.  Because renegotiations  occur when
a debtor wouid choose outright repudiation  to full repayment of the
existing obligations and the selection of a new debt contract under free
entry, existing cred-.tors  are able to extract all of the debtor's surplus
over the utility he obtains in repudiation.  The lenders will increase
their profit, in general,  by offering  funds when the debtor experiences a
low income realization  providing the debtor with strictly greater utility
than the repudiation level.  The increase in repayments received in the
high income states naturally makes up for the cost of the transfer in low
states; a recalcitrant debtor will be held to his repudiation level of5
utility in at least the  highest state in this model.
However, there are gains from trade available despite the presence of
sovereign immunity  which are not attained in the bargaining model.  In the
lowest income state, creditors will maximize their profit in a
renegotiation  by assuring a lower consumption level for the debtor than  he
attains in  higher states even if full  consumption smoo'  - .ng  is possible
under the potential of repudiation.  This inefficient  exploitation of
opportunities for restricted risk sharing is consequent to the ex post
renegotiation of contracts  which convey seniority rights and are not a
priori binding state contingent commitments for the creditors.  Further, it
is argued that the inefficient  pattern of international  transfers this
infers is not a result restricted to the one-sided bargainir.g  conduct in
which the creditors make all renegotiation  offers.  Loans are not written
with state contingent repaym'ent  schedules which can bind them to provide
net transfers in some states the next period without any further obligation
on the part of the borrower.  The surplus negotiated over ex post in the
model of the  paper is created by the seniority  privileges of existing
creditors.  Both the privileges conveyed by contracts and the conduct of
bargaining are part of an exogenous institutional  environment which can be
varied in this approach.  That is,  bargaining power can be given a
different distribution across parties.
The approach of this paper contrasts somewhat with that taken
elsewhere in the anlysis of sovereign  debt negotiations as a bargaining
problem and as a problem of implicit  contracting.  Bulow and Rogoff (1989),
for example, model debt repayment negotiations  as a noncooperative
bargaining game.'  In their  paper, the bargaining game is repeated
indefinitely,  but repetition plays no role.  The equilibrium bargaining6
outcome for each period is the same  whether there is only one period or
many.  In this paper, the cost of repudiation is paid in the future, and
regotiations in any period can depend  upon the full history of borrowing
and repavment.  However, in keepLng  with other bargaining approaches, the
manner in  which bargaining is conducted is taken exogenously in a
noncooperative game.
In the model of Bulow and kogoff, the lender possesses an endowment of
one unit of a grod each period whiich  can be traded with the debtor.  This
good is simpiy the right to disrupt intratemporal  trade for that one
period; supplying the good, that is, suspending the imposition of
sanctiorts,  is asswimed  to be costly to the lender.  This cost is the benefit
the creditor derives from disrupting the debtor's trade for one period.
There are gairns  from trading the one unit of sanctions between the two
parties,  Ifn  their  model, these are divided using an alternatina offers
bargaining game in which the equilibrin  share of the gains from trade
obtained by the creditor exceed the  benefit he would derive by imposing the
sanctions instead.  Each period, the  price paid for the sanctions (that is,
not to be imposed)  by,  the debtor is simply the price paid for one unit of a
diminishing cake derived  by Rubinstein (1982).  Current negotiations are
over the gains from trade only in the current period and not over future
gains.  There is a implicit institutior,  which conveys the right of the
creditor to impose sanctions  on the debtor; presumably, the endowment of
one unit of sanctions for each period must be purcnased with the payment of
its  present value.  Alternatively, this might be viewed as a model of
extortion: the only difference is in the social and legal viev ot how the
ability to impose sanctions is acquired.
Grossman and Van Huyck (1988)  propose a model of the view that debt7
renegotiations are nart of an implicit  contract governing a repeated
consumption smoothing relationship  when a risk-averse debtor has random
income  and lenders are risk-neutral.  While they do not explicitly solve
for the equilibrium pattern of capital flows, they argue that because there
are gains from trade in an insurance relationship,  debt contracts  which are
not written ex ante as state contingent can yield state contingent trading
as part of the implicit contractual relationship.  The sancttons available
for supporting trade are an interruption  of intertemporal rather than
intratemporal trade.  The same framework is  used in this paper; however,
tho baigaining equilibria do not duplicate the outcome of state-contingent
claims which observe sovereign immunity.  While the full dynamics of
equibrium paths of lending  and repayment are not solved in the analysis
below, several qualitative  characteristics of equilibria are derived.
The next section of the paper examines debt r-<iegetiations  when the
debtor possesses private information.  In this extension of the simple
model of sovereign borrowing debt, reschedulings and new capital inflows
may replace simple debt write-downs in equilibrium renegotiations iTn  order
to satisfy a set of incentive compatibility  constraints.  Alternatives to
debt write-downs separate borrowers according to their current state, which
is not observable directly by creditors.  By inducing  self-selection by
borrowers, equilibrium  debt renegotiation  offers induce revelation of the
debtor's private information.  Therefore, the offers made by existilq,
creditors are not necessarily equivalent to a new contract which anv
entrant would provide plus a possible current debt-service  reduction.
Debt-renegotiation in this  model leads to a dynamic behavior of net capital
flows and debt-service obligations that may be of some interest.  '*bon
initial indebtedness is low, poor states of the world for deb;ors l  -:od  to8
large increases in debt burdens although the net inflow  of capital is
negative or small.  The marginal rate of interest for rescheduled debt can
become very large as a consequence of the asymmetry in information.
A natural extension of the analysis of these two sections is the
introduction  of bilateral bargaining ex post, to give debtors more market
power than simply access to new lenders.  The adoption of the
noncooperative strategic approach to the Nash bargaining problem in the
complete and perfect information  model will not affect qualitatively the
outcomes of debt renegotiation.  Under incomplete information  about debtor
characteristics,  separation of different types of borrowers occurs through
strategic  delay rather than choice over a number of simultaneous offers
made by creditors.  The third section presents an approach to extending the
analysis under asymmetric information  to a strategic  Nash bargaining
framework.  Both separating and pooling equilibria are possible outcomes.
The model outlined includes  capital accumulation, so that depreciation of
the per capita physical capital stock is  part of the social cost of
delaying agreement in debt renegotiations.
The fourth section briefly summarizes  a multi-period contracting
approach when the debtor  has sovereign immunity  and lenders can credibly
enter into contractual obligations  binding on them  which are enforceable in
creditor nation courts.  An application of such contracts,  which
incorporate, explicitly  or implicitly,  the possibility of revision, is the
self-enforcement  of restrictions  on debt-dilution  and provisions for
debt-seniority.  Contracts providing access to future loans on favorable
terms provide an incentive for performance contingent on future events;
repayment terms for early periods compensate lenders for the expected loss
on these future  contract options.  An alternative to the two extreme9
information  assumptions is also discussed.  A more realistic assumption may
be that the debtor's current state is  observable by creditors, but that
policies (for  example, those affecting investment levels) chosen by debtors
are unobserved by lenders.  In this case, inefficient  policy choices for
the debtor will be induced in equilibrium by the pattern of capital flows
over time because contracts cannot be written or renegotiated contingent
upon the choice of policy.  The adaption of a socially efficient plan may
require coordinated action by both lenders and borrowers.  When the only
policy instruments  available for transferring  resources for debt repayment
from the private sector to the government are distortionary taxes, the
post-tax rate of return to investment  will be endogenous to the net
transfer  anticipated.  Equilibria can exist that involve periods of large
capital outflows requiring  policies creating significant deadweight losses.
Since the optimal policy choices for the government depend upon the supply
of external credit, the rate of return to foreign lenders could be rising
in the amount lent.  A large reduction in the current trade surplus  may
lead to an adequate shift in the  marginal productivity  of new loans to
support the lower current debt service requirement.  However, the debtor's
optimal policy choices  may not be time consistent, so that commitment by
both parties may be required to attain an efficient flow of resources.
The last section offers concluding remarks.10
I.  Debt Renegotiation with Seniority Privileges
This section discusses the renegotiation of debt service obligations
in a version of the familiar Eaton-Gersovitz (1981)  model.  The sovereign
debtor always has the option to repudiate her obligations outright and
suffer consequent sanctions.  The reduction in social  welfare for the
debtor country that sanctions can cause is limited, so that the borrower
has limited liability for debt obligations.  I assume that the threat of
penalization for repudiation is credible and that creditors receive nothing
by imposing sanctions.  The behavior of the borrower is derived by
maximizing a discounted stream of felicity  of curient consumption subject
to a set of constraints.  This represents  a decision maker's social welfare
function.  A single good is produced and consumed.  For simplicity,
investment is ignored, so that output is  an exogenous random variable.
Under the informational  assumptions of this section and the next,
investment  plays no essential qualitative role.
If the debtor chooses to repudiate, she receives a level of utility,
V, which depends on the current realization  of output, y, and possibly on
the value of the outstanding debt service obligations,  R.  That is, the
repudiation level of utility depends on the debtor's current state, (y,R).
The borrower's felicity function,  U(c), is concave, displays positive
marginal felicity of current consumption,  c, and is continuous.  In
equilibrium, the borrower will face a set of debt-contract  offers in the
event she chooses to pay current debt service  and another set of offers if
she seeks to renegotiate current contractual  obligations.  Because I assume
a stationary  environment (output  is identically  and independently
distributed each period), the  borrower can always select the same debt
contract each period by paying the interest  obligation on the constant11
principal every period.  Since the realized level of output is observed
before current consumption and the  new loan is chosen, the borrower will
select different contracts (or  repudiation), including a possible request
to renegotiate, depending upon the current state, (y,R).
An important  assumption is that there is free entry in debt contracts
- any expected profitable contract  will be offered by a pool of potential
lenders.  If a loan providing non-negative expected profits will be
accepted  by a borrower, then it will be offered by some creditor.  When a
debtor prefers repudiation to repayment  and selection of a new debt
contract from this pool of potential lenders, existing creditors have an
incentive  to offer combinations of net current payments and new debt
service obligations that cannot be obtained from the market.  Such
renegotiations are modelled in a setting in which current creditors make
offers to their debtors who choose to accept or reject these offers, but do
not make counteroffers.  The market power of existing creditors is limited
by the potential entry of new creditors.
The utility maximization problem for debtors is first described.  This
provides constraints for the creditor's  maximization problem.  A  debt
contract is a pair (2 ,  Rt  ),  where Q  is the principal provided at time t
and RC+1  is the total debt service obligation due at time t+l, or,
equivalently, the time t+1 present value of the contracted repayment
obligations.
In the event of full repayment, the borrower's value is given by:
Vr(yC R)  =max  [U(yt  + I  R ) +  E(  R  1
t'  t)[(t  t  t)  C  Y+ls  t+l)
(1)
with respect to 2  and Rt+
subject to (2t,  Rt+1 )  E  S,12
where  the  set  S is independent  of (Yt,  Rt).  The  expectation  is taken  with
respect  to  Yt+i;  V(.,  )  will  be defined  below. The set  S is  the
equilibrium  set  of debt  contracts  providing  non-negative  expected  profits.
The  difference,  (Qe  - Rt), is  the  net  inflow  of funds  at time  t. The
discount  factor,p,  is  between  0  and  1.
Let the  debtor's  repudiation  value  under  limited  liability  be given  by
V(yt,Rt)  which  is increasing  in  Yt and  non-increasing  in  R  t2  In the  event
of renegotiation,  the  debtor  will  choose  a contract  from  a set  of debt
contracts  that  depend  on the  information  available  to  creditors. This is
assumed  to  always  include  R  and  the  realization  of  Yt is  assumed  to  be
common  knowledge  in  this  section. In  the  next  section,  it is  debtor
private  information.  Throughout,  the  debtor's  utility  function  is  assumed
to  be common  knowledge.
Define:
Vre (y R)  max  [U(y +t  R) +  EV(y  R  )]
(2)
subject  to (t  R  ,Rt+)  E  S(y  t  t.
This  latter  set  contains  S and  will include  additional  contracts  if
Vr(yt,R  ) is less  than  V(y  ,Rt). The  value  of the  debtor's  optimal  program
is  just
V(y  R  )  - max  (V  re(y  ,  R  )  V(y  ,R  )),
t't  t  t'  C 
(3)
since  V  re  (yt,R) is at least  as great  as  V (y,Rt).
The  distribution  for  output  is  assumed  to  have  compact  support. The
expectation  of V is  taken  with  respect  to  Yt  I  use  the  shorter  notation
EV(R)  for  the  remainder.
Creditors  are  assumed  to  be risk  neutral  (therefore,  expected  profit13
maximizers)  and  face  an  opportunity  cost  of loans  given  by a discount
factor,  p.  A one-period  debt  contract  provides  exjected  profits  given  by
E,r(t,  Rt+i)  -2 t  + pE(RIRt +1)
(4)
where  the  expectation,  taken  with  respect  to the  distribution  of output,  is
of the  actual  period  t+1  present  value  of  debt  service  payments  conditional
on the  contractual  obligation,  Rt+i
The legal  status  of existing  debt  service  obligations  within  or
between  creditor  nations  will  be crucial  for  determining  the  set  of offered
contracts. For  example,  while  loan  covenants  binding  on debtor  behavior
may  not  be credibly  enforceable,  seniority  provisions  binding  on subsequent
lenders  may  be enforceable  in  creditor  nation  courts. A senior  creditor
may  be able to  recover  fully  any  payments  made  to successor  lenders  in its
home  country  up to its  contractual  claim. On the  other  hand,  if all  claims
have  equal  priority,  creditors  will  share  according  to some  proportions  in
actual  settlements.
Suppose  that  the  variable  x denotes  the  surplus  available  for  meeting
debt  service  in  an  equilibrium  settlement  of obligatior.s  and  that  x is
distributed  according  to  the  cumulative  distribution  function  F(x).  This
distribution  depends  upon  the  distribution  of  y and is  conditional  on R, in
the  general  case. With  strict  seniority,  the  senior  creditor  obtains
expected  profits
Eir(I,R)  - -I + p  [  xdF(x)  +  R  r  dF(x)  ]
(5)
where  M is  the  maximum  total  settlement  possible.
A second  creditor  will  obtain14
Ew(Q,  R;  R)  - +P  [p  r  (x-R)dF(x)  +  R AR dFJ
with contract (Q,  R)  given prior commitments R.  In such an instance, the
set of new debt contracts available to a borrower will be identical for any
number of concurrent loans taken.  The debtor can do no better than to
accept a zero expected profit contract from a single source.
If lenders share in payments according to the portion of their claims
in total claims, then each lender attains expected profits
En(l.,R ;R)  - -A  +  p  [(R  /R)  fR  x  dF(x)  +  R.  dF(x)  I,
i  i  0  iR
where  R  - E  R..
iI
In this case, in an equilibrium debt contract, each lender correctly
anticipates subsequent contract offers so that expected profits for every
creditor are non-negative.  The set of total debt contracts that attain
non-negative expected profits is the same  whenever obligations to new
lenders do not take precedence over existin6 debt, since the conditional
distribution of x is unaffected.  However, the equilibrium debt contract
will not be the same.  Under strict seniority, the choice of contract made
in equation (1) will be the  best zero-expected profit contract for the
debtor (equivalent  to the Nash equilibrium contract under observability
defined in Kletzer (1984)).  In the absence of seniority provisions (for
example, the neutral case above), the equilibrium  contract will be an
interest-rate taking zero-profit  contract, as defined in  Kletzer (1984)
(equivalently,  in Gale and Hellwig (1985)).  This type of conti:act  is
socially inefficient, in that it is dominated for the debtor by the strict
seniority outcome.  For now, we assume that seniority  provisions
enforceable  between creditors in their home courts are credible.
The initial  description of equilibrium debt renegotiations in this15
standard approach  will be made assuming that the debtor always  has the
option to pay contractual debt service and -elect  a new debt contract that
will realize a non-negative expected profit.  However, a new debt contract
may not be offered if existing obligations are not met, because new
creditors' claims are jun.or to existing claims.  If new funds are offered
when old debts are not being serviced, in the absence of a negotiated
settlement, the debt service obligations on these new funds are at least as
great as they  would be for incremental  funds taKen in addition to the
original contract (that is, the additional debt service that  would be
incurred to obtain a larger original contract).  The additional debt
service obligations  will be even greater if the old creditors can claim
additional interest from payments made to the new suppliers.
Free entry in debt contracts and the limited liability of debtors
impose limitations  on the outcomes attainable by creditors in debt service
renegotiations.  Constrained contract renegotiations for the lender can be
described  using a simple bargaining model in which the creditor offers
contract revisions to the debtor.  In this setting, I argue that a
first-best contract  will not be a standard debt contract with ex post
renegotiation of debt service  because additional risk sharing may be
provided by state-contingent  contracts.
Because the equilibrium set  of debt contracts offered will be bounded
from above in X, there exist states such that the borrower prefers
repudiation to full repayment.  These states can be shown to occur with
positive probability.  Because creditors lose the entire opportunity cost
of their loans in a repudiation,  any settlement that provides some current
repayment or net expected future  payment will be preferred by the creditor.
The borrower's alternative of choosing a zero-expected profit contract (but16
junior  claim)  from  another  lender  without  repaying  will,  at the  worst,
result  in  a loss  to the  current  creditors  of the  opportunity  interest  on
the  maximum  settlement  they  would  obtain  in the  current  state. Assume,  for
simplicity,  that  no additional  interest  is attainable,  then  the  debtor
prefers  to repudiate  if
V(y,R)  >  max(max  (U(y  +  Q)  +  18EV  (R  +  k)),  Vtiy,R)),  (6)
(Q,!R+R)CeS
Modification  for  imperfectly  enforceable  seniority  clauses  or enforceable
contracts  specifying  overdue  interest  charges  is  straightforward.
Whenever  (6)  obtains,  creditors  will select  contracts  that  provide  the
debtor  with  utility  at least  equal  to the  repudiation  level. These  offers
will  depend  only  on the  debtor's  current  state. If  we  make the
simplification  that  V(y,R)  - V(y),  then  the  equilibrium  expected  profits
for  debt  contracts  is  given  by (5),  E  are  F(x)  depends  on the  level  of debt
service  obligations  and  the  distribution  of y.  The  set  S is given  by
S  - (  (Q,R)  I  Eir (Q,R)  >  0)
When only  the  lender  makes  offers  that  the  debtor  accepts  or rejects  (in
the  presense  of free  entry  of  new  creditors  under  our  seniority
assumption),  the  equilibrium  renegotiated  offers  satisfy
max  [  R  - l(y  )  +  P  fo  t  xdF(x)  +  p  R(y  )4r  (Y)  dF(x)  ]
(7)
with  respect  to (Yt),  R(yt)
s.t.  V (Yt)  5 U(  Yt +  (Y)  - R)  + PEV(R(yt)).
Note that  any  solution  cannot  be contained  in  S since  (6)  holds. The
solution  to this  problem  is identical  to  the  solution  to  the  problem:17
max  R
s.t. V(yt) s max  [  U(yt +  Q' - R) +  PEV(R')  ],
with respect to (i',  R') eS
The profit-maximizing lender  will never choose to make an offer of a net
flow of funds to or from a debtor that involves  an incremental loan
providing negative expected profits.  Any creditor-optimal renegotiation is
equivalent to a simple reduction in current debt service (in expected
present value terms)  plus a new loan attainable from any potential entrant.
The creditor should be indifferent  between offering a current net payment
with a new debt service obligation and offering a reduction in the current
debt service just enough that a new creditor will take over the debt and
the  borrower will not choose to repudiate.  Because the debtor always has
the option to repudiate, the expected  value or continuation in (l)-(3)  must
be at least as great as the expected  value under repudiation.  Because the
debtor has limited liability for debt obligations in this framework, the
utility attained with a current zero net flow of resources is always at
least as great as the level of utility received  by repudiating.  Therefore,
no new flows from lenders are required to avoid repudiation.
The seniority  privilege implies that debt obligations serve the
purpose of detering current and future  entry by other lenders, so that an
increase in the debt burden for the next period can lead to a rise in the
present value cf net payments received by current creditors.  This suggests
that relending unmet debt service  provides old creditors with a larger
claim on future payments than a new lender could obtain for the same price.
If the debtor prefers repudiating to meeting her current obligation in full
and choosing a new contract from any potential lender, then senior
creditors can hold the debtor to attaining only her repudiation level of18
utility. However,  they  cannot  improve  upon  offering  the  debtor  a new  debt
contract  which  any  new  entrant  would  plovide  along  with a  gross  repayment
not  exceeding  their  present  claim. The  marginal  amount  an existing
creditor  would  be  willing  to  pay  for  a future  debt  claim  is the  same  as
what  a new  creditor  would  pay for  the  same  right. That is,  the  benefit
that  seniority  provides  the  existing  creditor  is  the  present  value  of
present  gross  repayments  only;  relending  unmet  debt  service  obligations
does  not  have  a special  option  value  to  old  creditors.
In equilibrium,  the  lender  maximizes  its  present  value  by offering  a
reduction  in  current  payments  along  with  a  new  loan  that  any  new  entrant
would  have  offered. The  carried  over  debt  obligation  is  just  the  sum  of
the  new  debt  burden  for  the  free  entry  contract  plus  any  additional  debt
obligation  that  provides  positive  'option'  value. This  latter  addition  is
constrained  by my institutional  setting  to  be the  old  debt  obligation  minus
the  net  repayment  made  plus  accrued  interest. This  entire  contract  can  be
reinterpreted  as a simple  ccmbination  of a gross  repayment  today  plus  a  new
zero  expected  profit  one-period  debt  contract. That  is,  in  equilibrium  the
existing  creditor  will  gain  nothing  by relending  existing  debt  obligations
on any  terms  other  than  those  that  a new  risk-neutral  lender  would.  If  any
debt-service  obligation  has  positive  value,  then  there  is  a price  greater
than  zero  at  which  another  lender  would  have  purchased  it.  This  price  is
just  the  extra  amount  of new  loan  principal  that  an entrant  would  provide
to  obtain  the  additional  debt-service.  The  set  of zero  expected  profit
debt  contracts  provides  the  equilibrium  value  of  future  debt  service  claims
to  any  creditor,  including  existing  ones. The  existing  debt  service
obligation  is simply  the  upper  bound  on the  ex  post  return  achieved  by the
old  creditors.19
If the debtor is held to  her repudiation level of utility, then'  the
best action for the existing creditor is to reduce the payment this period
and provide a new zero expected profit contract.  However, the set of
contracts which might be offered depend upon the equilibrium  behavior of
creditors when full repayment and selection  of a new zero expected profit
contract is not optimal for the debtor.
Even when senior creditors are able to hold the debtor to her
repudiation level of utility in every state of nature, they  may gain from
allowing the debtor to attain higher utility in some income states.  If the
creditors choose to extract all the debtor's surplus in any outcome, then
the equilibrium payments they must receive in any state cannot exceed zero
when loan autarky is the available sanction.  In general, profit
maximization implies that in some states even when full repayment is
inferior to repudiation, the lender  will provide positive flows, so that in
those states the debtor achieves positive surplus over repudiation without
the discipline of potential entry.  This just follows from the gains
available from trade in insurance.
However, a consequence of the bargaining conduct assumed in the
presence of potential entry and seniority  privileges is that any debt
renegotiation  by current creditors is equivalent to offering a debt
contract which any potential entrant would offer and possibly a reduction
in current debt service  payments.  If the debtor just attains  his
repudiation level of utility, then  no current inflow of resources occurs in
the consumption smoothing  model adopted, as one would expect.
Given the seniority privilege of the existing creditors, denial of all
future inflows to a recalcitrant debtor could be a credible threat.  In
this model, there are gains from trade due to the difference in attitudes20
towards  risk  which  can  be attained  because  future  access  to credit  is
always  possible  (and  valuable  to  the  debtor). Reversion  to autarky  bz
creditors  or  debtors  suggests  by the  Folk  Theorem  for  repeated  games  that
if  the  common  rate  of discount  is  below  some  threshold  exceeding  zero,  then
a Pareto  efficient  outcome  can  be attained  in  a subgame  perfect
equilibrium.  With the  bargaining  possibilities  assumed  in this  model,
complete  smoothing  of the  risk  averse  debtor's  consumption  (as  required  in
a  Pareto  optimum)  will  not  occur  in  equilibrium  for  any  positive  discount
rate. This  follows  because  the  lender  will  always  benefit  from  reducing
the  amount  provided  in  low  income  states  of  nature  cognizant  of the
reduction  in the  net transfer  it  can  command  in  high  output  states  as a
conseque.ice  when  consumption  is  smoothed  fully  across  states.
Suppose  that  consumption  is  fully  sr,oothed  across  states  and  that  the
sanction  provided  by creditor  seniority  rights  is  an embargo  on access  to
future  consumption  smoothing  possibilities.  If  all  bargaining  power  ex
post is  held  by the  creditor,  then  tie  debtor  achieves  exactly  the
repudiation  level  of utility  in  the  highest  income  state. The  creditor
provides  an inflow  in  the  lowest  state. If this  is reduced,  then  less  will
be repaid  in some  other  state  to assure  that  repudiation  does  not  occur  in
the  highest  state. For  example,  if there  are  two  income  states  then  a
redu  tion  in the  transfer  to  the  debtor  in the  low  state  leads  to  a
reduction  in the  net  repyament  made in  the  high  state. However,  the
creditor  will  always  gain  ex post  in  the  lowest  state  by reducing  the
consumption  of the  debtor  fully  aware  of the  consequences  for  repayments  in
other  states. This  follows  because  the  debtor  discounts  the  reduction  in
inflows  in low  states  when  choosing  between  repudiation  and  acceptance  of a
renegotiation  in the  highest  state. Likewise,  the  creditor  discounts  the21
reducticn  in receipts  in the  highest  state  when  offering  less  in the  low
state. Therefore,  full  smoothing  of the  debtor's  consumption  is  not  an
equilibrium  outcome  for  any  value  of the  discount  rate  greater  than  zero.
In terms  of the  model,  let  Y2  be output  in  the  highest  state  and  y1 be
the  lowest  output  level. Assume  that  the  debtor's  surplus  is zero  in  the
highest  state  in equilibrium:
V(y2)  - U(Y 2 - R  +  Q2)  + AEV(R2).
If the  debtor's  consumption  is  fully  smoothed,  then
V(yl)  <  U(yl - R' +  11)  +  6EV(R,),
where  R  and  R'  are  che  renegotiated  repayments  and ( 2',R 2), (2 1 ,R 1) are
zero  expected  profit  loans,  and
cl -Yi  - RI  +  2  1  =Y2  - R  + 12  - c2
Suppose  that  the  lender  raises  R'  and  lowers  R  so  that  the  debtor  will  not
repudiate  in the  highest  state. Note  that  the  change  in  the  debtor's
utility  in this  state  is  given  by
-U'(c 2)  (dc 2/dc 1)  - f  (d/dc 1)EV(R 2)
This  must  exceed  zero  and  is larger  than
-U'(c 2 )  (dc 2/dcI)  OU  (  1)'
where  -dc 2/dc 1 is the  increase  in  c2 consequent  to  a decrease  in  c1.
The  change  in the  creditor's  profit  in the  lowest  state  is  given  by
di(yl)  I  1  A  dEw(R  1)
dcl  d 
21  +1  d
dc2
Let  - U'(c 2) (dc 2/dcl)  - U'(cl)  0,  so  that
.dn(y 1)  >  1 -2  (U'f  i)/U'(c
which  exceeds  zero  if  c1-c 2 '  Therefore,  the  lender's  profits  are  maximized22
in the lowest output state in a subgame perfect equilibrium of this model
by offering less than full smoothing of the debtor's consumption stream.
No assumptions have been made here about the distributions  of the
equilibrium consumption or net transfers (even though output is identically
and independently  distributed between periods).
These implications should not be restricted to the special case that
the creditor proposes renegotiation offers  which are either accepted or
rejected  by the debtor.  If the debtor instead  makes all of the
renegociation  offers, then a deviation from full smoothing  will also occur
because it  woul.i  raise the debtor's equilibrium  utility in the highest
state to reduce the amount repaid.  For any fixed distribution of
bargaining power in this institutional  environment, complete smoothing of
the debtor's consumption appears to be ;.ncompatible  with equilibrium.  If
bargaining power is shared between lenders and borrowers, then the outcome
of alternative distributions of bargaining strength  will be different
divisions of the present value cf the surplus  available to the existing
creditors.  The renegotiation of contracts  which are not ex ante contingent
and convey seniority privileges to old creditors which restrict  new
entrants using exogenous bargaining conduct  creates an inefficiency for
risk sharing beyond that created  by sovereignty  alone.  It should be noted
that the seniority rights assumed refer to the rights of all existing
creditors  vis-a-vis entrants who lend before a settlement of the existing
claims.
A common argument (for  example,Krugman (1985))  is that the relending
of contractual debt service obligations  when a debtor is  unwilling to meet
them currently is a preferred action for lenders  because the option on
higher future payments is obtained at no cost in  new capital.  The general23
optimization  problem  for  creditors  examined  here implies  that  unmet
debt-service  may  be rolled  forward  until  additional  increments  to the  debt
burden  are  valueless  to  creditors. Current  creditors  will  not  choose  to
offer  any  renegotiation  that  is  not  equivalent  to  a new  loan  contract  any
entrant  would  offer  and  a  permanent  write-off  of  part  of the  debt-service
obligation.  However,  until  the  maximum  debt  burden  that  could  ever  be paid
is reached,  the  latter  part  of this  package  will  be trivial  in general
(that  is,  no debt  reduction  is  offered). Relending  unmet  debt-service  is
valuable  only  as long  as it  prec.udes  possible  future  entry  by other
creditors. Several  authors  (for  example,  Cline  (1983),  Krugman  (1987),  and
Sachs  (1984))  have  argued  that  lending  to  a recalcitrant  debtor  is
defensive  for  creditors  collectively  because  it raises  the  present  value  of
their  claims. In the  model  above,  creditors  can  increase  their  expected
profits  by providing  insurance  to  the  debtor. New inflows  to the  country
will  not  ba as large  in low  income  states  as dictated  by either  expected
profit  maximization  conditional  on  being  in  a  high income  state  or
unconditional  (ex  ante)  expected  profit  maximization.  However,  creditors
are  unable  to  bind themselves  not  to  maximize  the  present  value  of their
program  after  low  income  states  have  been  realized. In this  noncooperative
bargaining  model,  optimal  behavior  by creditors  is time  inconsistent.  The
welfare  gains  from  insurance  transactions  (defensive  lending)  cannot  be
fully  realized  in the  renegotiation  of short-term  obligations  for  the
creditor,  as  well  as for  the  debtor,  however  bargaining  power  is
exogenously  distributed.
Figure  1 depicts  the  set  of new  debt  contracts,  S, and  indifference
curves  for  the  debtor  for  the  more  general  case  of the  repudiation  utility
depending  on  both  y and  R.  The  horizontal  axis  measures  the  net inflow  of24
resources to the debtor.  The set S is not bounded from above in
contractual  obligations in the presence of equilibrium renegotiations.  The
maximum expected present value of a renegotiation  attainable by creditors
can be seen to be the greatest value of -R such that the set S irntersects
the repudiation indifference  curve.
The presence of debt service  obligations as a state variable
introduces a simple history dependence in the expected utility of debtors
and the renegotiation offers made available.  Past realizations of income
affect current choices of debtors and, in the event of renegotiation,
existing creditors.  In this simple Markov model, however, the set of new
debt contracts, S, is  unaffected.  In equilibrium,  only partial risk
sharing between risk-neutral lenAers and risk-averse  borrowers is achieved
through  debt contracts with renegotiation.  This occurs because creditors
are limited in their abilities to obtain large payments in the  best income
states of nature.
The result that smoothing of the debtor's consumption is incomplete in
equilibrium for all positive discount factors contrasts  with the result of
Grossman and Van Huyck that complete smoothing arises if the discount rate
is low encugh (but  poritive) when the implicit state contingent contract is
supported  by trigger strategies.  The important  distinction between the two
approaches is that when no ex ante state contingent agreement is made and
bargaining power is fixed the ex post agreement is not equivalent to what
would occur in an equilibrium  with state contingent contracting subject to
potential repudiation.  In this  model, lenders are not bound to accept
obligations to provide new inflows ex post in low income states, although
it is in their  best interest to provide negotiated (ex  post) new funds.
Worrall (1989) derives the dynamics of lending under potential25
repudiation  when one-period staLe contingent  contracts are feasible.  In
his model, debtors are constrained from lending to third parties s.ithout
fear of expropriation in the event of repudiation of their (state
contingent) debt obligations.  Debtor savings,  however, plays a crucial
role for the nature of the equilibrium  path.  Unlike the approach taken
above, state contingent obligations are binding on the creditor, who can be
obligated to provide a net transfer to the debtor in poor states of nature.
With state contingent claims, the debtor's consumption in an equilibrium
path will not change between periods if the realization of income  does not
rise above its historical maximum.  Each period for  which the maximum
realized level of income rises, the consumption level also rises.  With a
finite number of states of nature which occur with positive probability,
complete smoothing of debtor consumption is  eventually attained.
Because creditors have available debt instruments  with seniority
privileges vis-a-vis other creditors and payments are negotiated ex post in
my approach, full smoothing of the debtor's consumption does not arise in
an equilibrium.  That is, these institutions  are assumed in place of state
contingent contracts which might bind the creditor to a commitment to
provide future transfers  with no claim to a repayment.  In  Worrall, the
equilibrium allocation is constrained  efficient (constrained  by the
possibility of repudation  by the debtor),  while in this section the sharing
of risk  between lenders and borrowers is inefficient in the same sense.
The source of this inadequacy of sequential  negotiations is the absence of
opportunities for tne lender to credibly commit itself to forgive  debt and
provide new loans at the same time.  A constrained  efficient equilibrium
path fails to be time consistent in this model of renegotiation.26
II.  Private Information and Separating Equilibria
In this section, debtors are assumed to possess private information
about the  utility they receive  by accepting  various debt contracts.
Therefore, they have an incentive to report incorrectly their willingness
to repudiate to obtain a reduction in debt service payments.  Whenever
lenders perceive a positive probability, given current debt obligations,
that a borrower would prefer repudiation to the selection of a new debt
contract with repayment, the  borrower may be able to misrepresent its
private information.  If creditors are unable to observe the realized value
of output, under the equilibrium renegotiation scheme of the previous
section in every output state the debtor will claim willingness to
repudiate.  Some contract with debt service reduction chosen in a low
output state will be preferred in a high output state to repayment.
Creditors will seek to design the offers they make in debt renegotiations
to induce correct revelation of the private information.  Lenders will want
to offer debt renegotiation  packages  which will be chosen over repudiation
in poor events but which are inferior  to repayment in favorable outcomes.
The private information  possessed  by debtors can be anything that
affects the social welfare attained by choosing different debt contracts.
For example, national leadership  may be better informed  about factors
determining the social costs of achieving given levels of trade surplus
than are foreign creditors.  For expositional  simplicity, let the realized
value of output be unobservable  by creditors, although we intend it to be a
proxy for some measure of debtor country surplus.  The distribution of
output is assumed to  be common knowledge, as are all other characteristics
of the borrower.  Also, suppose that output, y, can only take a finite
number of values with positive probability.  These are ginan by Y1, Y2 .27
.,y  in increasing order.  The random  variable, y, can be thought of as
parameterizing a class of utility functions for the national leadership.
Creditors do not know what type of decision-mnaker  they face at each date.
Each period a new type is drawn from the common distribution.  In this
interpretation, the  period length is the time a particular type is in
power.  Again, the identification  of y with output is not intended to be
literal 3.
The creditors' problei.  is to choose a set of contracts to offer in the
event of renegotiation requests such that their ex ante expected profit is
maximized, when debtors ex post maximize utility over the set of contracts
(including renegotiation  packages) available.  A contract renegotiation
will be chosen only if it is the maximal contract in the realized state
over the set of contracts offered for all states.  The creditor's inability
to observe output implies that debtor self-selection alone must be relied
upon to assure the anticipated behavior in each output state.  The
creditor's problem is to design a contract set that induces truthful
revelation.  The equilibrium set of renegotiations  offered will separate
different output realizations  through contract choice, so that ex post the
private information is revealed.
The set of equilibrium  offers tnder free entry in ex ante contracts,
debtor-creditor relationships)  and debtor limited liability is
characterized again using a principal-agent framework.  Because simple
reductions in debt service will be chosen by the borrower in either low or
high output states, offered revisions of debt repayments under asymmetric
information  about output realizations  must observe a self-selection
constraint.  The contracts offered to assure non-repudiation in low output
states must be inferior  to other contracts available when the debtor28
realizes  high  output  value. The  addition  of constraints  assuring  correct
contract  selection  leads  to  a separating  equilibrium.  There  will  be n
contracts  available,  with  a different  contract  selected  in  each  output
realization.  The  contract  intended  to  be selected  in a  particular  state
will  provide  the  maximum  utility  to the  debtor  in that  state  over  the  set
of  offers. Some  of these  contracts  will  simply  be the  best  choices  over
the  set  of  new  debt  contracts  available  from  any  potential  creditor. That
is,  the  set  of ex ante  debt  contracts  will  always  be available  wit!.
repayment  of  contractual  debt  service.
The  set  of ex ante  debt  contracts  (those  available  from  any  new
entrant  creditor  following  repayment)  will  be found  by first  characterizing
the  set  of ex  post  repayment  revisions  offered  in  equilibrium  for  a given
current  debt  service  obligation,  R.  Each  member  of the  set  of debt
contracts  offered  by the  current  creditor  will  consist  of a current  net
payment  and  a debt  service  obligation  for  the  next  period. These  contracts
will  not  be equivalent  to  the  debt  reductions  derived  in  the  previous
section. Imposition  of Lhe  self-selection  contraints  is  found  to result  in
lower  ex  post  profit  in  each  state  than  could  be attained  if  the  value  of
output  were  observed  directly  by the  creditor. The  equilibrium  set  of
contracts  involve  higher  levels  of debt  service  for  the  next  period  for  low
output  realizations  than  would  arise  with  symmetric  information.
The  set  of ex  ante  offers  is  derived  using  the  solution  to  the
creditor's  ex  post  problem,  as a perfect  equilibrium.  The  set  of initial
non-negative  expected  profit  contracts  offered  is  a subset  of  what it  would
be without  private  information.  Lenders  are  assured  non-negative  expected
profits  ex  ante,  so that  ex ante  debtor  utility  .s  lower  than  under
symmetric  information.  In  most  states,  however,  debtors  are  better  off  ex29
post  than  if they  could  then  report  their  output  state  before  revised
repayment  offers  are  made.  In states  for  which  repudiation  provides  higher
utility  than  full  repayment,  the  debtor  can  receive  higher  utility  under
debt  renegotiation  than  the  repudiation  level. Since  under  symmetric
information,  the  debtor  is  always  forced  to  either  its  repudiation  utility
level  or its  maximal  utility  over  the  set  of new  contracts  with  repayment
(whichever  is larger),  direct  reporting  of the  value  of output  before  the
choice  of  a contract  ex post  is incredible.  Direct  revelation  only  occurs
with the  selection  of a separating  equilibrium  contract  revision.
Given  a level  of existing  debt  service  obligations,  R,  the  existing
creditor's  problem  is to  find  contracts,  (i.,  Ri),  for  each  i, to  maximize
expected  profits. The  set  of  zero  expected  profit  debt  contracts,  S, will
be found  implicitly;  however,  we assume  that  it is  non-empty  and  define  a
loan  offer,  2',  for  each  next  period  debt  service  obligation,  R  ..  That  is,
Q'(R  ) is  the  size  loan  which  repayment  obligation  Ri equals  in  expected
present  value  for  creditors. The  present  value  loss  to  a creditor  from
offering  the  contract
(2i,  R.),  is (Qi  -Q(Ri))
The  existing  creditor's  problem  is  given  by
n
max  Z  p  (RF(R.)  -I)
i-1
(8)
with respect  to ((2.,Ri))  for  i-l,.  . ,n,  subject  to,  for  all  i,
(a) U(yi+ .i  - R)  + PEV(Ri)  2  V(y7,  R)
(b) U(yi  +  2.  - R)  + PEV(RI)  > t(YiP,R)
(c)  U(y.  +  Q. - R)  + PEV(RI)  2  U(y.  +  2.  - R)  + pEV(R.),
for  all  ,  i.30
The probability of output yi being realized is p..  Constraint (a) is the
restriction that repudiation is inferior to the debt contract offered for
each value yi, and (b) is the restriction on offers created by free entry
in new contracts.  The third is the self-selection constraint.  The
contract (I.,  Ri) is at least  as good for the debtor in state i as every
other offer.  I assume that indifference  for the debtor is resolved in the
lender's favor to assure a solution.
The solution to this problem yields a set of n offers ex post such
that debt repudiation  never occurs.  The contracts offered to the debtor
which are taken in some states for  which repudiation is superior to
repayment on contracted terms can provide greater utility than outright
repudiation.  Likewise, in some states for which selection of a new ex ante
debt contract (with  full repayment) is preferred to repudiation, the debtor
will attain even higher utility by taking a contract offered  by the current
creditor  but not by new entrants.  The self-selection constraints produce
these  possibilities by creating trade-offs  between expected profit in
different states.  The equilibrium contracts are interrelated.
The Appendix provides a proposition which summarizes the properties of
the equilibrium set of debt renegotiations.  In equilibrium, utility is
nondecreasing and the net payment by the debtor is nondecreasing in output,
while the next period debt service obligation is nonincreasing in output.
The set of debt renegotiations  offered may force the debtor in the lowest
output state, if repudiation is ever preferred to repayment, to its
repudiation level of utility.  This may also  be true for  higher states.
The debtor may choose contracts from the ex ante zero expected profit
set (contracts  new entrants offer) in some  high output states.  The
equilibrium ex post contract in these states  may provide even higher31
utility. If the  debtor  attains  just  Vr(y,,R)  in  state  y., then  the
existing  creditor  just  offers  the  same  set  of debt  contracts  which  any  new
entrant  will  offer,  S.  If the  solution  to the  creditor's  problem  has the
debtor  choose  repayment  and  a new  zero  expected  profit  contract  in a state
j,  then  the  equilibrium  choice  in all  higher  states  is  also  repayment  as
contracted.  An important  result  is t"at  the  debtor  may  be better  off
renegotiating  with  existing  creditors  even  if she  is  willing  to  repay. In
this  case,  the  equilibrium  contract  set  offered  by the  existing  creditors
is  such  that  the  debtor  is indifferent  between  the  equilibrium  debt
contract  intended  by creditors  for  the  realized  state  under  renegotiation
and  the  contract  intended  for  the  next lowest  state,  except,  possibly,  in
two  situations.  The first  occurs  when  the  current  state  renegotiated  debt
contract  provides  just  the  repudiation  level  of utility  for  that  state.
The  second  occurs  when the  contract  chosen  in  equilibrium  involves  full
repayment  for  the  present  realization  of output.
This  latter  property,  called  continuous-state  indifference,  and  the
above  exceptions  deserve  explanation.  If the  debtor  is  offered  a contract,
(x 1  Ri  ),  the  expected  present  value  for  the  creditor  in the  next
highest  state  can  always  be increased  if the  debtor's  utility  can  be
reduced  in this  next  highest  state. Therefore,  unless  utility  cannot  be
reduced  further  in state  i,  the  debtor  is indifferent  between  the  debt
renegotiations  for  that  state  and for  the  next  lower  state. When the
debtor  achieves  exactly  the  repudiation  level  of  utility  or the  level
assured  by free  entry  in  new  debt  contracts,  this  indifference  may or  may
not  hold.  If the  debtor  chooses  a  new  debt  contract  with full  repayment  in
both the  present  state  and  next lower  state,  under  concavity  of felicity,
this  property  does  not  hold.32
Figure  2 shows  a separating  equilibrium  set  of debt  renegotiations.
The  intertemporal  marginal  rate  of substitution  portrayed  decreases  with  y
for  a given  contract  because  U(c) is  strictly  concave. Concavity  is
important  for  demonstrating  the  proposition;  however,  concavity  of  U(c)
does  not imply  that  the  derived  indifference  curv6s  are  convex  everywhere.
The  relationship  between  expected  value  and  contractual  debt  service
obligations  depends  on the  entire  set  of  equilibrium  dett  contracts. The
indifference  curves  are  drawn  smooth  in Figure  2 for  si;nplicity;  with  a
finite  number  of states,  they  will  each  contain  kinks.
The  equilibrium  ex post  contracts  display  a simple  relationship
between  the  intertemporal  rate  of substitutior.  in  contract  terms  along  the
boundary  of  S  (zero  expected  profit  contracts)  and  the  intertemporal
marginal  rate  of substitution.  These  are  equal  if full  repayment  occurs  in
equilibrium. If the  debtor  in statc  i is  assigned  contract  (x.,R.),  then
the  slope  of the  boundary  of  S at the  contract  (Q'(Ri),Ri)  equals  the
intertemporal  rate  of substitution  if the  debtor  is  not  indifferent  in
state  i+1  between  this  contract  and (x.  , Ri+ ).  In the  case  of continuous
state  indifference,  the  rate  of contract  substitution  equals  a weighted  sum
of the  marginal  rate  of substitution  in  state  i  and in  starts  i+1. The
weight  on the  state  1+1  marginal  rate  of substitution  4s negative,  but
smaller  in  absolute  value  than  the  weight  on the  state  i rate  of
substitution.  This  reflects  the  trade-off  to  ex post  expected  profit
between  lowering  state  i  profit  by revising  Ri and  x. and  increasing  state
i+1  profit  by reducing  utility  in state  1+1 (lowering  x1+1).  The  marginal
rate  of substitution  of  R. for  x. in  state  i is  less  than  the  intertemporal
I1  X
rate  of contract  substitution.  Therefore,  state  i  profit  alone  is  not
maximized. The  weights  are  implicitly  given  in  the  proof  of the33
proposition;  they  depend  upon  the  probability  distzibution  of output  and
the  marginal  felicity  of  consumption  in  the  two  states.
Derivation  of the  set  of initial  loan  contracts,  S, remains. The  ex
ante  expected  profit  is  given  by
n
Ewr  - -1  + p[R  + E  P1 (r(R.)  X  .]'
i-1
where (L,Ri) are  solutions  to  the  creditor's  ex post  optimization  problem.
The  last  term  (summand)  is the  expected  present  value  of the  reduction  in
debt  service  received. Even  if  Q.  exceeds  V'(R.),  the  lender's  return  may
exceed  opportunity  cost  in  some  states. Maximization  of  expected  profit
will lead  to  a non-zero  probability  that  the  debtor  is  willing  to
repudiate. Risk  neutrality  of creditors  allows  risk-averse  debtors  to
achieve  some  degree  of insurance.  As in  the  well-known  principal-agent
literature  (for  example,  Holmstrom  (1979),  Harris  and  Raviv  (1979)),  risk
sharing  is incomplete  due  to  the  need  for  equilibrium  debt  renegotiation  to
observe  the  self-selection  constraints.  Maximization  of ex ante  expected
profit  gives  the  set  of  non-negative  expected  profit  contracts  offered  by
new  entrants. I assume  that  the  utility  function  for  the  debtor,  possible
output  states,  and lender's  discount  factor  are  adequate  to  assure  that  the
set  is  non-empty  and  potential  debtors  choose  to  borrow  initially.
It should  be noted  that  the  maximal  ex ante  contractual  debt  service
obligation  is  at least  as great  as the  resulting  ex  post  debt  service  for
the  succeeding  pqriod  in the  lowest  output  state. Any increase  in  debt
obligations  beyond  this  level  will  never  be  met.  This  debt  obligation  is
the  maximum  amount  such  that  ex  post,  the  debtor  repays  in full  and  selects
a new  zero  expected  profit  contract  in  the  highest  output  state. Figure  3
portrays  this  equilibrium.  The indifference  curves  are  vertical  beyond  R1,34
as increases in R.  have no effect on the debtor because such incremental
repayment obligations are never repaid.
In a separating equilibrium, the net capital outflow from the debtor
can be either positive or negative in a state for which repudiation
dominates full repayment  of existing debt service and choice of a new ex
ante debt contract.  This contrasts with the equilibrium outcome under
symmetric information.  The possibility that the lender provides additional
inflows to a recalcitrant debtor arises  when the repudiation level of
utility depends upon the debt service obligations that are repudiated.
Contracts that satisfy the necessary conditions for expected profit
maximization in low states may involve positive values of x, because the
intertemporal  nmargirial  rate of substitution is finite for the repudiation
level of utility at contracts with zero net outflows (x equal to zero).
This possibility does not arise if the cost of repudiation depends only on
the current value of output.  In this case, the debtor will always prefer a
cor.tract  with zero net outflow to repudiation,  regardless of the
next-period repayment obligation.  Therefore, in the binding state, a net
payment to the existing creditor is made under debt renegotiation.
It should be noted that the creditors' two-stage optimization problem
can have many equilibria; nothing in this framework rules them out.
Multiple equilibria are likely to occur when repudiation costs depend upon
current debt service obligations.
In the presence of debtor private information, the equilibrium pattern
of debt renegotiation  reduces the extent to  which existing creditors can
extract surplus from a borrower.  This implies that the social cost of the
informational asymmetry is a reduction in the flow of capital to the debtor
countries.  Also, because the debt contracts  offered in a renegotiation35
serve the additional  purpose of signalling debtor characteristics,
(therefore,  willingness to fulfill,  contractual obligations), the borrower
can become locked into a permanent relationship  with senior creditors more
quickly for a  given event t'.an  under symmetric information.  The dynamics
for this model are not fully derived, however.
III.  Separation through  Costly Delay in Bargaining
In the preceding two sections  borrowers have no more bargaining power
than just the options to return to the loan  market or repudiate.  The
equilibria discussed in  both the  perfect and imperfect information cases
are equilibria for a strategic  bargaining game in which the creditor makes
all offers when output in any given period to be storable for some positive
length of time (see  Sobel and Takahashi (1983)).  For a strategic
bargaining game, with alternating offers, debtors will achieve  better
outcomes ex  post than  were attained in the preceding solutions.
Nevertheless, the ex ante contract offers will adjust to account for the ex
post divisions of surplus in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Bulow and Rogoff (1989)  adopt the strategic approach to Nash
bargaining games under complete information, due to rubinstein (1982), to
sovereign debt negot;ations.  The creditor  who acquires the right to impose
sanctions  by making an initial loan sells a promise not to impose sanctions
each period to the debtor.  The amount paid in the subgame perfect
equilibri.um  -ach period for this property right is just the debt service
payment.  The discounted stream.  of these  prices is equal to the amount
initially lent  under perfect competition among lenders.  The perfect
equilibrium is unique if penialization  benefits 'reditors  an arbitrarily
small amount.  The complete information  model presented earlier in this36
paper needs minor additional assumptions to fit the Rubinstein (1982)
framework: let output be storable and let the debtor be risk neutral.  In
this setting, renegotiations  will never result in  new inflows  unless a new
creditor will also supply them.  Under risk aversion, access to new credit
in the presence of seniority  provisions can become the object bargained
over, but the characterization  of renegotiations  will not be affected.  In
the complete information  bargaining approach, there is no particular reason
why the initial contract does not simply specify che perfect equilibrium
debt service payments.  If it does, then no bargaining actually takes
place.
The asymmetric information  model can also be extended to a bargaining
framework.  Delays to agreement can lead to separation of debtors by type
in an alternating offers bargaining game.  Simultaneously  offered contracts
by the creditor no longer serve the purpose of inducing truthful
revelation.  Incomplete information  can be introduced,  as before, through
asymmetric observability  of output, or through  private information about
rates of time preference.  Delaying agreement can arise strategically to
separate  borrowers with different realizations  of privately observed random
var.ables, or of different social preferences,  which are unobserved by
creditors.  Delay can also arise because one or both parties find that
waiting for publicly observed information to arrive is individually
rational.  This case may be important  when creditors, as well as debcors,
have limited liability and are therefore  risk loving.
This section outlines an approach to modeling socially costly delays
to a resolution of debt repayment  problems.  The impasse in the current
repayments crisis and the consequent lack of funds to finance capital
formation  have been discussed  widely.  In noncooperative  Nash bargaining37
models, equilibrium delay to agreement has been shown to arise in the
presence of incomplete information  by a large  number of authors.  I discuss
one source of delay: strategic  delay necessary to convey the debtor's
private information.
The approach is to adopt the bargaining model with one-sided
incomplete information of Admati and Perry (1987), in  which has equilibrium
paths displaying strategic delay to external borrowing  by a growing
economy.  Following Bulow and Rogoff, we assume that  by lending the
creditor purchases a right to impose sanctions; the  promise not to exercise
this right is then sold to the debtor at the subgame-perfect  price and
time.  Unlike their model, agreement  need not occur immediately  here.  A
major cost of delay to agreement will be the absence of new credit.  New
creditors  may not provide additional funds to a growing debtor in the
presence of unresolved existing claims.  The reason is that the net inflow
of resources will affect the  bargaining game between old creditors and the
debtor and therefore the investment  undertaken by the borrower.  The future
flow of output following a given loan will, in general, be less if existing
claims need to  be resolved.
Several possible approaches can motivate the adoption of the strategic
delay model.  The debtor is assumed to have private information about the
value it places on avoiding sanctions.  Sanctions  are assumed to lead to
lower levels of per capita consumption than are attainable along an
equilibrium  path for the bargaining game, so that debt repudiation will
never occur in equilibrium.  Capital accumulation is possible, and either
the labor force grows at a constant proportional rate or physical capital
depreciates.  Foreign  borrowing can be motivated  by assuming that either
the planner's discount rate or the marginal productivity of capital exceed38
the world rate of interest.  A simple  model is one in which output, which
depreciates in storage, is traded for capital goods which are
noncompetitive imports.  During an impasse, the  per capita capital stock
declines.
The private information of the debtor is about the surplus available
to  pay creditors.  This can be the current realized  value of output in a
stochastic model, as in previous sections,  or it can be the minimum level
of per capita consumption politically acceptable in a renegotiation, or
other debtor characteristics.  Suppose that whenever per capita consumption
falls  below some level, c, political leadership is replaced immediately
(through  either parliamentary or nondemocratic means).  Then the surplus
available to service debt obligations, that is, the value placed on
purchasing the promise not to impose sanctions, is the amount of current
resources exceeding those needed to sustain c along a perfect equilibrium
path.  The country's policymakers are likely to be more informed about c,
or, more generally, the social cost of generating given levels of trade
surpluses (for  example, the excess  burden of indirect taxes).
Suppose that output is produced using capital and labor according to a
constant returns-to-scale technology.  Output is storable (depreciation  can
occur, but need not) and is consumed or traded for investment goods, which
are not produced at home.  Let output be given by
Yt-  f(kt)
and let
A~k -k  - k  i  - nk t  t+1  t  t  t
Storage is given by st, so that
Y  - ct  +  (-vSt-  St)-  Rt39
where - is the rate of depreciation of stored output and Rt is output
exported.
The trade surplus is just
R  -it
t  t'
Repudiations lead to consumption equal to or less than the minimum
politically acceptable in a negotiated settlement.  If lenders  benefit from
imposing sanctions,  by any arbitrarily small positive amount, then no
subgame-perfect equilibrium involves  repudiation without consequent
penalization (see Bulow and Rogoff).  I simply assume that penalization for
repudiation is a credible threat.
The policymaker's social  welfare function is  just
U - E  Ot  c  t
t-O
The value of the optimal capital accumulation  program along a
subgame-perfect equilibrium path can be defined directly.  Note that once
the debtor's private information is revealed, a complete information
bargaining subgame follows for the model described  here.  The creditor's
lack of information about the value of sanctions to the debtor derives from
potential differences in the type of debtor, rather than imperfect
information  about its current state.  With this assumption, examination of
a single episode is adequate,  but the generalization is a formal exercise.
The debtor's type is characterized  by the maximum surplus she can
transfer to creditors in exchange for suspension of the threat of sanctions
at a given time.  Time matters both because the social discount rate is
positive and the per capita capital stock declines during delays to
agreement.
Suppose that the low c type repays at time 0.  Then the surplus40
(denoted  h0) in a given state, ko 0 is  defined by the problem
V(ko I  h  )  - ax  ( co  +  pV  (kl)
k
subject to
k1  - ko  +  i  - nkO'
c-  - f(k 0)  - (h  +  i),
where V(k 1 )  is the value of the debtor's  utility along a subsequent
equilibrium path.  Let ho  be the  maximum value of h such that c0 2  c.
The debtor's value can be derived in terms of the amount paid the
creditor and the time at which settlement takes  place by noting that if  her
type is revealed, then subsequent  negotiations  have the unique complete
information bargaining solution, so that the value function is well
defined.  If a pooling equilibrium results (which is a possible jutcome),
then the game repeats.  If the state  variable, k., is observed by the
creditor, however, the type  can be inferred after one round with a pooling
equilibrium outcome.
For given kol define the debtor's  value of an agreement as
S( ht - R, t),  for the low c type, and
S( It - R, t),  for the  high c type.
where It <  ht for an agreement which transfers an amount R at time t  to
creditors.  S(.,.) is increasing  in the first argument and decreasing in
the second.  The approach of  Admati and Perry (1987) can now be applied.
Suppose at time 0, the lender  can make an offer to which the debtor
replies at time 1.  The deb,.r will never accept an offer that  provides
less  value than the value of an offer it can make at time 1 that would be
accepted by the lender.  The discount factor for the lender is determined41
Vy the opportunity interest rate.  The results of Admati and Perry can be
directly applied to this model with algebraic modification.  The high
surplus type can refuse a current high offer and wait to receive an offer
that the low surplus type would accept.  In equilibrium, the low surplus
debtor cannot offer at time 1 an amount  which the  high surplus type would
prefer to wait and offer to taking the time 0 offer.  The low surplus
debtor must wait long enough to make a counteroffer to separate itself from
the high surplus type when the creditor's first (time  0) offer is the
equilibrium offer for the high type in the complete-information  bargaining
game.
Multiple equilibria emerge from this approach.  Unique separating
equilibria exist for large enough creditors' priors that the debtor is of
the high surplus type.  These involve offering the complete information
game division for the high type at time 0.  The low type offers its
complete- information game equilibrium division after a time delay adequate
to signal its type.  Separation  becomes costly  by reducing the surplus
obtained by the low value debtor and reducing through delay the available
output that may be divided.
If the creditor's prior belief is that there is a low probability that
the debtor is the high surplus type,  both multiple separating and pooling
equilibria are possible.  For low priors, there exists only a unique
pooling equilibrium in  which no delay occurs.  This latter equilibrium
involves lenders offering the complete information  equilibrium repayment
for the low surplus type in time 0.  Either type accepts this offer.
One consequence of introducing  capital stock depreciation as a cost of
delay is to increase the  possibilities for pooling equilibria to arise.
Another is that the cost of delay to the high surplus type can, in general,42
be lower than the cost for the low surplus type.  Of course, the
depreciation of the capital stock also increases the effective discount
factor for the lenders.  Resulting separating equilbria may entail even
longer delays with capital decumulation when the cost of delay is lower for
high surplus types.  If there are many possible types of debtors (as noted
above), a separating equilibrium (or mixed pooling and separating
equilibrium) must entail a delay between counteroffers  made by each
possible type of debtor, in declining order of surplus.  Because this type
of delay does not disappear as the length of time between possible offers
shrinks to zero, significant  costly delays to agreement can arise.
IV.  Possible Extensions
Multi-Period Contracting
In the simple stationary consumption-smoothing  model wit'r/h  votential
repudiation, multi-period debt contracts serve no additional purpose if
seniority provisions are enforceable.  If every creditor claims on an equal
footing renegotiation proceeds, then multi-period contracts v.zŽ
renegotiation  may arise in equilibrium.  Creditors offering zei-c-expected
profit loans recognize that an entrant  will offer an additional loan on
terms preferred by the  debtor to those that would not reduce the value of
earlier creditors' claims.  A two-period contract  may be profitable that
reduces the debtor's incentive to borrow additional  amounts.  Such
contracts can increase the ex ante utility of the debtor in  equilibrium by
moving the chosen contract away from the interest-rate-taking  one toward
the constrained first-best  one (Kletzer (1984)).  Because renegotiation is
possible, such a contract offers the debtor an option to choose a
particular second-period  loan that, in events in  which it  would be taken,43
new lenders would not offer.
An example of such contracts is one offering a loan that, taken  by
itself, is expected to be profitable for the first period.  A clause is
included  which obligates the lender to provide a new loan during the second
period, which entrants would not offer if performance criteria are met by
the debtor.  If these covenants  are not fulfilled, the lender can choose to
declare a default and not provide the second loan.  A restriction on debt
dilution in the first period is a potential covenant; this type of contract
can be self-enforcing for the sovereign debtor.  In the case of sovereign
loans, creditors  may be subject to third-party  enforcement of their
obligation if the debtor does not breach the contract, which can specify
that disputes  be brought to the home court of the creditor.  The debtor
will generally choose not to breach the contract through first-period debt
dilution.  Because the debtor can choose to exercise the second-period
option or select another debt contract in the absence of renegotiation, the
debtor's expected utility the second  period is increased, inducing
first-period  performance (if  output in the first-period is private
iLnfuxmaLtion,  then contract breach may occur in equilibrium).  These
two-period loans  may provide access to debt contracts in the second period
tha. the debtor desires in poor output states over market contracts and
chooses not to accept in high output states.  Because of the debtor's
limited liability (and consequent  market imperfection), these loans offer
insurance possibilities that a sequence of one-period loans with
renegotiation do not.  In the event of a demanded second-period revision of
debt service obligations (which  may become less probable), the obligations
of the creditor to supply a second loan can  be voided by a contract clause.
Therefore, in the event of a renegotiation of debt service, the44
multi-period  contracts  have  no effects.
The  creditor's  two-period  lending  problem  is  to  maximize  the  expected
two-period  profit  with  respect  to the  choice  of contract  terms  while
deciding  whether  or  not  to declare  a subsequent  default  in  the  event  of
contract  breach  subject  to a series  of constraints.  These  constraints
include  the  debtor's  choice  of accepting  the  contract  over  other  contracts
available  and  the  equilibrium  choices  in  each  output  state  at each  of the
two  future  dates  of the  debtor. That  is,  the  creditor  correctly  values  the
repayment  streams  along  each  equilibrium  path  for  the  subsequent  subgames.
In  the  absence  of creditor  observability  of the  debtor's  output,  the
incentive  compatibility  constraints  employed  in  the  previous  section  are
imposed  at each  date.
If  the  opportunity  co3t  to  creditors  is  a  random  variable,  then  an
additional  motive  arises  for  multi-period  contracts. Since  the  set  of
offered  contracts  shrinks  with  an increase  in the  world  rate  of interest,
the  second-  period  loan  option  will  provide  desirable  insurance
opportunities  to the  debtor;  if  the  lenders'  opportunity  cost  of funds
falls,  then  the  second-  period  (or  later)  debt  contract  can  be revised. In
equilibrium,  in  these  events  the  resulting  debt  contract  will  be the
debtor's  best  contract  from  among  those  offered  by other  lenders. While
risk-neutral  lenders  will  offer  multi-period  contracts  providing  higher
utility  to  borrowers  than  equilibrium  single-period  loans,  interest  rate
increases  benefit  borrowers  ex  post  and  interest  rate  declines  lead  to
contract  revision  ex  post. Therefore,  the  length  of multi-period  contracts
in  equilibrium  is limited  by the  ex ante  expected  profitability  of debtor
welfare-improving  contracts. Such  contracts  exist  at all  because  the
limited  liability  of debtors  leads  to  equilibrium  contractual  marginal45
rates of interest exceeding average  rates of interest on their debts.
Unobservable Debtor Policy Choices
The supposition that debtor income is  unobservable by creditors may
strike readers as peculiarly unrealistic.  The natural alternative is to
suppose that income is publicly observable  while policy choices by the
debtor affecting the distribution  of income  are unobserved  by creditors.
In a stochastic environment,  moral hazard in policy selection arises if
policies enhancing the probability of favorable outcomes for creditors
(that is, if they raise anticipated  debt repayments) are costly to debtors.
The choice between investment and current consumption is a standard
example.
The first-best contracts for simple principal-agent  problems have been
characterized  when output is publicly observable,  while the agent's choice
of an action affecting the distribtuion  of outpi2 is known only to the
agent (Holmstrom (1979) and Rogerson (1985)).  These contracts specify
divisions of output as functions of the observable quantity, output alone.
In the repeated  principal-agent problem, the first-best contract depends
upon the entire past history of output, as well as current output.  The
extent of risk sharing between a risk-neutral  principal and risk-averse
agent is limited  by the necessity that the output-contingent contract
provide incentives for the agent to choose output-increasing actions.
In the model used in th.s paper, assume that debtor income is observed
by lenders,  but that the distribution of income realizations depends upon a
set of current policies selected  by the debtor, which cannot be observed
directly by creditors.  Let the distribution  of income  conditional on
policy choice be stationary, and assume that current-period felicity
depends positively on current consumption and negatively on some measure of46
policy choice (for example, investment).
Constrained first-best capital flows have been characterized  undar a
number of special assumptions for the problem of maximizing debtor utility
subject to the constraints that repudiation is never chosen in equilibrium,
expected profits are zero in every period, and the contract is incentive
compatible in the choice of policy.  A recent paper by Atkeson (1988)
incorporates  debtor private information  about the investment undertaken in
a repeated moral hazard model.  In his approach, state-contingent repayment
schedules are binding on the lenders in one-period contracts.  This allows
commitment by the creditors which is precluded in the model presented
above.  The analysis of ex post renegotiation  with limited commitment by
the creditors under given bargaining ccnduct may differ significantly from
that of first-best solutions for the repeated moral hazard problem.
Although it awaits investigation,  the absence of creditor commitment is
likely to increase the severity of the problem of coordination between
lenders and borrowers.
Suppose that the only policy instruments  available to the debtor
government for transferring  resou:ces from the private sector to service
debt create distortions in the domestic economy (for example, commodity
taxes).  In this case, the contracts that satisfy the first-order incentive
compatibility condition (that is, are locally maximal for lenders)  will
tend not to lead to the optimal pattern of capital flows (constrained  by
the asymmetry of information).  In such a model, a serious coordination
problem can arise between creditors and debtors  because there can be
complementarities  between policy choices and external capital flows.  Large
net capital outflows may be compatible  with distortionary policies that
reduce the expected return to new loans.  The possibility that47
unsatisfactory equilibria arise when the policies required to meet large
debt service obligations are distortionary  can create a significant
international  public policy problem.
V.  Conclusions
The analysis of bargaining between current creditors and a
recalcitrant debtor in the consumption smoothing  model has led to the
identification of potential sources of inefficiency in the intertemporal
allocation of resources beyond that created by sovereign immunity  alone.
The sanctions available to creditors to use in the event of repudiation
result in future losses of utility for the debtor; the seniority privileges
of creditor both help insure the credibility of such sanctions in this
model and lead to an inefficient  cutcome of exogenous bargaining conduct of
borrowers and lenders in renegotiations.  A main point of the major part of
the analysis in this paper has been the potential for bargaining to lead to
inetficient outcomes in renegotiations  because of this  privilege.
In the preserce of informational  asymmetries, equilibrium for the
creditor-debtor renegotiation  problem is a separating type.  In lower
output states, smaller current payments are made with larger debt service
obligations carried forward.  A debtor unwilling to meet current debt
service  may obtain new net inflows in a constrained optimal response by
creditors only in the  version of the model in which the penalties for
repudiation increase  with the debt service repudiated.  This follows
because a debtor may prefer to repudiate  now with R relatively low to
simply consuming current output  while incurring larger future debt service
obligations with the consequent reduction in expected utility.
The separating  nature of equilibria derived in the imperfect48
informatinn  case may have implications for the evaluation of the
(stochastic)  debt service burden.  Subsequent  poor output realizations  may
lead in only a few steps to the maximal level of debt service obligations
possible with net outflows or only minor net inflows of capital along the
way.  This might be the  most significant  cost of the informational
imperfection.
Our model stands in contrast to an important  paper on indeterminacy in
lending under possible bankruptcy by Hellwig (1977).  In that paper, the
creditor sets a credit limit,  which is optimal ex post to relax when it is
reached by the debtor.  If it is not relaxed,  bankruptcy occurs
automatically and the lender receives  nothing.  Additional loans are
expected to be profitable because they raise the value of  existing loans;
no new creditor will provide them,  but an existing creditor should.  Time
inconsistency arises because the interest  schedule is given to the
creditor, and the creditors'  policies are restricted to setting limits on
the stock of debt.  We have relaxed two constraints imposed  by Hellwig:
default need not oe declared following  a breach of contract, and the
interest charged in a renegotiation of debt is a choice variable for the
existing creditors.  Current lenders  have access to a richer set of
policies.  Time inconsistency  arises in this  model instead through the
existing creditors' seniority  privileges in debt relationships.49
Appendix
Define  V(x.,  R)  U(y. +  -l  - R) +  EV(R,), where xi - 11-R.  The
following  proposition  characterizes  equilibrium  debt  renegotiations.  For
simplicity,  the  continuation  value  is  held  constant;  this  will  be
calculated  recursively,  maximizing  lender  profits  to  derive  the  seqg  ntial
equilibrium.  Therefore,  in  general,  part(c)  does  not  hold  in  a sequential
equilibrium.
Proposition:  Given  current  debt  service  obligations,  the  lender's  most
preferred  debt  ren.ugotiations  satisfy:
a)  x. and  R. are  both  non-increasing  in L.
b) V.(xi,R.)  is  non-decreasing  in i.
c) If V(y1,R) <  Vr(y,R),  then VI(x 1 ,R 1 )  - V(y 1 ,R).
(An  analogous  condition  may  hold for  additional  i)
d) Whenever V.(x.,R.) > max(V(y.,P), V (Y.,R)),
Vi(xiRi)  - Vi(x  i-,Ri  )  holds.
e) If V.(x.,R.) - Vr(y,,R), then (1,R.)  E  S,  -- Xi + R, and
(2j,Rj)  E  S,  for all j >  i, so that V.(xj,R.) - Vr(y., R), also.
Sappington  (1983)  presents  similar  results  to  part  of the  above  for  a
simpler  limited  liability  principal-agent  problem.
Outline  of proof  of  proposition:
To show  that  x. is  non-increasing  in i,  we use the  self-selection
constraint
U(y1 +  x1) +  PEV(Ri)  a  U(y 1 + xj) +  PEV(R ).
Let i>j,  then U(y; + xI)+PEV(Ri) > U(y,+x  ) + PEV(R ).  if  xi > x., because
U(c)  is strictly  concave. This  violates  the  self-selection  constraint  for50
state j.  Therefore, xi s x..  Monotonicity of EV(R)  in R  implies that R. <
Rj,  again using the state i self-selection  constraint.
Vi(xi,R.) - U(yi + x>) + PEV(Ri) is  non-decreasing in i  by
U(y,  +  xi)  +  PEV(RI)  >  U(y.  +  xj)  +  PEV(R.)
>  L  (yi  +  xj)  +  6EV  (Rj),
since Y.  > y
The Lagrangian for the creditor's optimization  problem is
n  n
L - E  p  (i  (Ri)  -- I)  +  Z  E  a.  V  (YxR  R  )
n , E  VI(Y  ,R))
n
+  E  7.(V.(x.,R.)  -V(y.,R)).
1  .L  2.  2.  .L2
Necessary conditions for a maximum are
Pi  - ((6i  + -Y)  + E  aij)  U (Yi  + x)  - a  U'  (yj  i  xi)
Pi' (d'/dR  i)  -'(Si (  + Yi) + Z  (a.ij  -ji  ))(-PEV'(R  i)).
Because the derivative of 2.  with respect to R. may not be well defined for
discrete  values of y, (2) should  be interpreted  as the appropriate weak
inequalities for right and left derivatives.  The function P(R.)  can be
shown to  be continuous.
Following Sappington (1983),  aij- 0 for j>i+l  and for j<i-1.  Using
the fact that x. < x.+1 if  j>i+l, suppose the converse.  Then, the i
self-selection  constraint implies
U(y 1 +  x.)  +  PEV(R.)  2  U(Yi  +  Xi+  )  +  PEV(R  i+1)
Concavity of U(c) implies
U(y  +  x.) +  PEV(Rj)  >  U(y,+,  +  x  +l)  + PEV(R  i+),
which contradicts the (1+1) self-selection  constraint.  A similar argument
holds for  j<i-1.  Therefore, only a,  *+' ai  _1  can be non-zero for any i.51
Fo:-th,er,  note that if  ac  >  0, then
U(Y  -+  x.)  + 6EV(Ri) - U(Yi +  x  1) +  PEV(R -1)  and
ier  ict  con-icavity  of U(c) and xi <  xi. 1 imply that
U(1V  +  x  )  +  BEV(R.)  <  U(y  1  +  x  +)  E  i-l i1  2.L  2.  y.  x.)iE(.
'herefore,  if  a  i-l >  0, ai-1 i =  0, and conversely.
Similarly,  for  a. i+l  and  a.+ 1 i'
n
S is convex, since R + Z  p.(I'(R.) - 2I) is non-decreasing in R.  The
fiowicing  arguments assume that d2'/dR.  is continuous in  R..
-ovri  ting (1):
]  =(n  + a nn1)  U'(y  + x  n  - n  U'(y  + x  ) n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  Un  +  n-  - n-li
;, then  a 1 must be zero.  Otherwise, either
!(x  ,R  ) <  Vr(Yn,  R), or
-. x ,R  )  <  Vr(Y  R)
0-  01  n-i,
V-iillows  by simply increasing  x  by e  and R  by 6  such that expected
_ainis  zero.  If 6)n-1>  0, then an n-1 - ° by the same argument.
t  k be the minimum  value for i such that 6  k>0  Note that  k>0
.;  i  that  6  >0° because a  and a  are both zero.  Also,
k+1  ~~k+1ik  kk+
f'r>°,  V.i(Xi.,Ri)  =  V(Y.,R)  which implies that V(y.,R)>V (y.,R).
7.:  ￿itot  equality, -y.  +  6.  >  0, and with inequality,  6.  0.  We can let
-.-  ,1  henever -y,>O. Let Q be the maximum value of i such that -y.>O.
1  . imlplies:
=6  U'(y  +  x)
n  fin  n  n
;,  = 6k lU'  Yk(y  +  xk+1)
k  =  k  +  ak  k-1)  U  (Yk  + Xk)
j  +c  i  j-I  +  aj  j+j  U'  4  +52
-a  U'  (Yj  + x;)
J-1+  j U  j  (YJ+  + xJ
for  all  j  < k, and
P1 (-Y  1- a1 2) U (Y 1 + xl) - a2 1 U'(Y2 + XI)
Suppose  71 is  zero,  then  al 2 > 0;  using  both (1)  and (2),  this  implies
that  (Q'(Ri)  A  .i)  must increase  if (xl,  R1) is  changed  so that  V 1 (xl,R  1)
falls  until  7,>0.  If  al 2 > 0, then  the  quotient  of (1)  and (2)  for  1-2
implies  that  reduction  of (x 2,R 2) along  V2 constant  increases  expected
profit. Therefore, a1 2 - 0 and  -1  > 0.  Note, if A'(R.) has unequal right
and  left  derivatives,  then  ak-1  k- 0 because  S is  convex,  but  aj +1 need
not  be zero  for  J>k.
Summing  (1)  over  all i  gives
n  n  k
ip--l  P  6.  i(Yi  Xi) +  2  ai 11 (U'  (y+x)  -U'(y+X  i))
1-i  i-k  1-2
k  I
i-2  i-1  i(  (Yi1 1 +xI)  - U'  (Y.  i+X-  I  +  Z  ai  U'(Y  i  +  X  )
The  arguments  above  can  be used  to imply  that  a1 ; 1 i  - 0.  Whenever
(6 i  1+  -Yi 1) >0,  °  i 11  -0  is  possible,  but  not  necessary. If
(6il  +  ji-  0, then a. i-l  > °
The  above  properties  can  be used  recursively  to  derive  values  for  each
multiplier.  The  quotient  of (1)  and (2)  when  a  i1  - 0  yields
dl'(RI)I/dRI - (-EV' (Ri))/(U'  (YI  + X)),
and if a  i -1  >  0,
dl'(R)/dR  - PEV'(Ri-)  (6 +I+aI  - a.
61+-YI+a 1 1 -)U'  (y 1+XI)  - (a 1+1 i)U'  (Y1 1+  x1 )
-EV' (R 1 )
U'  (yl+xl)53
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Notes
*  This paper is  based on an earlier paper, Kletzer (1988),  entitled,
"Sovereign  Debt Renegotiation  Under Asymmetric Information."  Sections I
and II are significantly  different and section III has been shortened while
section IV is nearly identical.
'Several  authors have also considered noncooperative  bargaining models of
debt renegotiation.  These include  Ozler (1988),  Fernandez and Rosenthal
(1988), and O'Connell (1988).
2Implicitly,  an assumption is  made about the debtor's access to insurance
from other sources which he would retain in the event of repudiation.  It
is assumed that no such possibilities exist (see Eaton (1989),  Gersovitz
(1983),  and Eaton and Gerscvitz (1981).
3Other analysis of asymmetric information  about debtor chdr.acteristics
include  Acharya and Diwan (1987)  and Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1988).
Both of these papers introduce  private information  about debtor's time
preference and investigate the effect of debt reduction schemes on
investment.  The issues studied  here are not discussed in the context of
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